

# Nominal Restatement

Ekaterina Jasinskaja  
University of Potsdam

This paper identifies, explores and provides a formal analysis to a phenomenon that I will call *nominal restatement*. Nominal restatement (NR) bears a certain similarity to nominal apposition (NA) as it is formed by two DPs that (a) share values of the grammatical categories that determine the function of the DP in the sentence (e.g. case); and (b) the second DP refers to or describes the same individual or set of individuals as the first one. For instance, (1a) implies that Joyce *is* the author of *Ulysses*, but this is not the case in (1b) and (1c). (↗ indicates list intonation.)

- (1) a. This book is about Joyce, the author of *Ulysses*.  
b. This book is about Joyce and the author of *Ulysses*.  
c. This book is about Joyce (↗), the author of *Ulysses* (↗) ...

The semantic analysis of sentences like (1a) should account for this observation, and one possibility is to use the approach of Potts (2005) which derives that Joyce is the author of *Ulysses* as a conventional implicature via functional application of the appositive *the author of Ulysses* to the anchor *Joyce*, which is triggered by the prosodic feature “comma.” However, there are cases that give rise to similar implicatures, but are not included by Potts in his notion of NA, and accordingly are not covered by his theory. Such cases will be subsumed under the notion of NR and constitute the focus of this paper. I will argue that whereas NA belongs to the domain of syntax and sentence semantics, NR is primarily a pragmatic phenomenon at the level of discourse interpretation—therefore the term *restatement*, which was originally introduced by Mann and Thompson (1988) to mean a rhetorical relation that connects discourse units that, roughly, reformulate or *restate* the same content in different words.

Assuming the notion of NA proposed by Potts (2005), the following differences between NA and NR can be pointed out. First, Potts argues that the DPs that form an NA must be adjacent, but this need not be the case in NR as long as both DPs are narrowly focused. Thus in (2) *the famous cyclist* refers to Lance, although John is immediately adjacent. (Small caps indicate nuclear stress.)

- (2) [ LANCE ]<sub>F</sub> is talking to John. [ The famous CYCLIST. ]<sub>F</sub>

Second, Potts proposes that in a NA the second DP is right-adjoined to the first one, motivating this by the apparent absence of such constructions in languages that forbid right adjunction categorically, such as Turkish and Japanese. In the Japanese example (3) *the mayor of Tokyo* is left-adjoined to the head *Ishihara Shintaro* and bears genitive case; the head in turn has dative case as dictated by the verb.

- (3) Taro-ga Tokyo totizi-no Ishihara Shintaro-ni atta  
Taro-NOM Tokyo mayor-GEN Ishihara Shintaro-DAT met  
*Taro met the mayor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintaro.*

If the case on the DP *the mayor of Tokyo* were changed to DAT, the sentence would become ungrammatical. However, if in addition a comma or an expressed prosodic break is inserted after that DP, cf. (4), the sentence would be acceptable, although it has a marked effect, as if the speaker wanted to “rephrase” her reference to the mayor. Thus (4) is an instance of NR and shows that unlike NA, this phenomenon is not restricted to right-adjoining languages.

- (4) Taro-ga Tokyo totizi-ni, Ishihara Shintaro-ni atta  
Taro-NOM Tokyo mayor-DAT Ishihara Shintaro-DAT met  
*Taro met the mayor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro.*

Further differences between NA and NR include the way they interact with quantifiers and scope, with the uniqueness presuppositions of definite descriptions, and other properties of the DPs. These differences as well as the similarities between NA and NR need to be explained.

In this paper I propose a pragmatic theory of NR based on two main assumptions: (a) by default, adjacent utterances in discourse address the *same* question under discussion (QUD); and (b) an utterance is interpreted *exhaustively* wrt. the QUD it addresses. These assumptions constitute the basis of the optimality theoretic approach to rhetorical relations developed by Zeevat (2006), although the consequences for NR can be demonstrated without reference to the specifics of Optimality Theory. Informally, the exhaustive interpretation of e.g. *Lance is talking to John* wrt. the question *Who is talking to John?* (suggested by the accentuation and the focus structure of (2)) states that Lance is the only person talking to John. If the next utterance *the famous cyclist* is interpreted exhaustively wrt. the same question, then the famous cyclist is also the only person talking to John. Hence Lance and the famous cyclist must be the same person. The “coreference” between the DPs that do not bear narrow focus, as in (4), can be derived by reconstructing (4) as a sequence of utterances “*Taro met the mayor of Tokyo. Taro met Ishihara Shintaro.*” in the spirit of Burton-Roberts (1975), and interpreting each utterance wrt. a QUD like *What happened?* in accordance with their broad focus. Then the coreference of the main eventualities can be established along the same lines: if meeting the mayor is the only (relevant) event that happened and meeting I.S. is the only event that happened, they must be the same event. Assuming that the participant of an event in a particular semantic role is uniquely determined, the identity of events entails the identity of participants, hence the mayor of Tokyo is I.S.

The formal implementation of this derivation can be based on any more or less adequate theory of exhaustive interpretation. For simplicity, I use the well-known approach of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984). This provides a general account of the semantic relationship between the DPs that form a NR, as well as both similarities and differences between NR and NA.

## References

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